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INIGO MONTOYA GOES TO WAR 
GARY LAWSON∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
In The Princess Bride,1 the conniving Sicilian Vizzini is constantly 
declaring that events that are obviously occurring in plain sight are 
“inconceivable.”2 The third time (in the span of five pages) that Vizzini 
proclaims something that is clearly happening to be “inconceivable,” Vizzini’s 
then-companion, the Spaniard Inigo Montoya, snaps, “You keep using that 
word! . . . I don’t think it means what you think it does.”3 
The voice of Inigo Montoya (well, actually the voice of Mandy Patinkin, 
who brilliantly deadpanned rather than “snapped”4 a version of the line in the 
movie adaptation of The Princess Bride5) was running through my head while 
I was reading the two books that are paired for this symposium at Boston 
University School of Law: Mariah Zeisberg’s War Powers: The Politics of 
Constitutional Authority6 and Stephen Griffin’s Long Wars and the 
Constitution.7 Each author’s analysis centers on single, repeatedly used words 
that I do not think mean what the authors think they mean. In the case of 
Professor Zeisberg, the word is “constitutional”; in the case of Professor 
Griffin, the word is “war.” Interestingly, Professor Zeisberg pays keen 
attention to the ambiguities latent in the word “war,” (Zeisberg pp. 5, 8, 12-13, 
19, 21) while Professor Griffin neatly avoids most of the problems raised by 
Professor Zeisberg’s use of the term “constitutional” by treating his conception 
of a “constitutional order” (Griffin pp. 4, 14) as descriptive rather than 
prescriptive. If one could somehow merge the two books, perhaps Inigo’s 
voice would be silenced. But as things stand, both books, while immensely 
valuable resources, are in need of significant clarification. 
 
∗ Philip S. Beck Professor, Boston University School of Law.  
1 WILLIAM GOLDMAN, THE PRINCESS BRIDE (1973). 
2 Id. at 88, 89, 92, 94. 
3 Id. at 92. 
4 Id. 
5 THE PRINCESS BRIDE (20th Century Fox 1987). 
6 MARIAH ZEISBERG, WAR POWERS: THE POLITICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY 
(2013). 
7 STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, LONG WARS AND THE CONSTITUTION (2013). 
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I 
Professor Zeisberg’s starting point is a Constitution without clear answers—
or at least without clear answers to some very important questions about the 
employment of military force by the United States. According to Professor 
Zeisberg, “the US Constitution’s allocation of the power to initiate hostilities is 
ambiguous.” (Zeisberg p. 5). By this she means at least three things: (1) the 
text of the Constitution employs key terms, such as “declare War”8 and 
“executive Power,”9 whose meanings, both alone and in combination, are not 
clear and thus give rise to competing accounts of which institutions of the 
national government can control the exercise of military power in particular 
circumstances; (2) this textual uncertainty cannot be dispelled by conventional 
legal tools of interpretation (p.12); and (3) the Constitution does not prescribe 
an authoritative mode of settlement to resolve differences when executive and 
legislative actors advance competing and inconsistent accounts of their powers. 
(pp. 6-8). Thus, she concludes: 
Both the Constitution’s text—which apparently commits the elaboration 
of the meaning of “war” to a potentially rivalrous interbranch 
relationship—and the history of war powers debates, where the branches’ 
interpretive claims are transparently driven by partisan, institutional, and 
policy rivalries, generate one common conclusion: core features of this 
area of constitutional policy do not intersect well with standard 
presumptions about the conditions of faithful constitutional interpretation. 
(p. 8). 
Let us assume for the moment (because it is true) that Professor Zeisberg is 
right that figuring out, for example, whether, when, and how the Constitution 
empowers the President to commit American troops to combat without 
congressional approval is not an easy task. At a minimum, any topic that can 
generate a three-way split, just within the relatively small family of originalist 
scholars, among Sai Prakash, Mike Ramsey, and Robert Delahunty and John 
Yoo about something as basic as whether the President can unilaterally 
respond to another country’s declaration of war against the United States10 is 
not likely to be a topic that is prone to generate obvious answers. Let us further 
grant (because it is true) that each department of the national government must 
interpret the Constitution in the course of carrying out its functions. And let us 
 
8 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. 
9 Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1. 
10 Compare Saikrishna Prakash, Unleashing the Dogs of War: What the Constitution 
Means by “Declare War,” 93 CORNELL L. REV. 45 (2007) (arguing that only Congress can 
respond to a declaration of war), with Michael D. Ramsey, The President’s Power to 
Respond to Attacks, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 169 (2007) (arguing that the President can 
respond, both defensively and offensively, once another nation initiates war against the 
United States), and Robert J. Delahunty & John Yoo, Making War, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 123 
(2007) (arguing that the President has an independent power to initiate hostilities even in the 
absence of a foreign declaration of war). 
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further grant (because it is true) that the Constitution does not designate any 
one department the supreme interpreter of the Constitution.11 How, within this 
framework, would one evaluate the constitutional claims of any given 
governmental actor? 
Professor Zeisberg delineates criteria to assess the interpretative 
performance of the legislative and executive departments. Because those 
criteria involve to some extent the ways in which each department engages the 
other, (pp. 38-39) she terms the theory employing these criteria “relational.”12 
The criteria themselves largely concern the ways in which each institution 
brings its own distinctive characteristics and expertise to bear on problems, so 
Professor Zeisberg terms them “processual” (or “processualist”) standards. (p. 
19). For example, the President “is able to command the resources of 
intelligence, diplomatic, and military establishments” and has distinctive 
capacities for “[r]ewarding and elevating subordinates who demonstrate 
excellence,” “experimenting with policy,” and “responding quickly to changing 
circumstances.” (p. 35). Congress, for its part, can facilitate “divergent paths of 
reasoning,” “harness the power of consensus politics” in the course of 
“lawmaking,” and “pool and weigh information from multiple sources.” (p. 
37). Actors within each department must “link their arguments about 
constitutional authority to their substantive agendas for security policy.” (p. 
33). The bulk of Professor Zeisberg’s book applies these criteria to legislative 
and executive assertions of power in a wide range of historical settings to see 
whether and how various actors brought these capacities to bear on real-world 
problems. 
I am no political scientist, so I would not even venture to speculate whether 
these criteria provide an apt metric for evaluating the foreign policy 
performance of governmental actors. They certainly seem plausible to me—but 
I also found the Sisler metric for rating pitchers plausible,13 so what do I know. 
Professor Zeisberg, however, means for these criteria to measure the 
constitutional rather than foreign-policy performance of government officials. 
That is where I think we encounter some problems with words. I have a hard 
time seeing what is gained by calling this a “constitutional” mode of 
assessment. 
I would have thought that the way to evaluate someone’s constitutional 
interpretation was by reference to a theory of constitutional interpretation. A 
 
11 On both of the latter propositions, see Gary Lawson & Christopher D. Moore, The 
Executive Power of Constitutional Interpretation, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1267 (1996). 
12 Id. at 41 (“The centrality of well-conducted interbranch responsiveness leads me to 
name this a relational conception of war authority.”).   
13 This quadratic-like formula—((2IP-H) + (SO- 4/3BB) – 0.25ER)/IP—was designed to 
supplant earned-run average as the measure of pitching effectiveness. It died such a quick 
and grisly death that it does not appear even to merit a Wikipedia entry. But I always 
thought that it made a lot of sense, especially since the earned-run average of a starting 
pitcher depends so heavily on the quality of the bullpen. 
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good interpreter employs a good interpretative theory in an honest, 
conscientious, and intelligent fashion to reach the result that is correct in a 
given context of knowledge. If one thinks, as I do, that a certain species of 
originalism is the uniquely correct way to interpret the Constitution,14 then it 
follows that interpretations are good or bad depending on how well they 
employ that methodology.15 If one benightedly holds to a different theory of 
interpretation, one would still expect that theory to guide the judgment about 
how to evaluate interpretations. In any case, it is no great mystery from the 
standpoint of interpretative theory “[o]n what basis . . . Congress, or the 
presidency, [should] develop its constitutional understandings.” (pp. 22-23). 
They should develop constitutional understandings based on sound 
applications of sound interpretative theory, just like everybody else. Good 
interpretations are good interpretations regardless of who makes them. What is 
sauce for the judge, or the scholar, or the citizen, or the nuclear physicist who 
happens to be interested in interpretation, is sauce for the President or 
Congress. The Constitution’s meaning does not change depending on the 
official title of the person who is reading it at the time. 
Professor Zeisberg would have it otherwise. She thinks that because 
interpretative theory cannot provide clear answers—what she terms 
“settlement” (p. 8)—some other criteria for evaluating interpretations must be 
found. As she forthrightly puts it: “Instead of evaluating whether the branches 
adhere to determinate textual meaning, we can evaluate them in terms of how 
well they bring their special institutional capacities to bear on the problem of 
interpreting the Constitution’s substantive standards about war.” (pp. 18-19). I 
am happy to grant that this might be a perfectly sensible way of “assessing the 
branches’ war powers politics.” (p. 31). But I simply don’t get why one would 
call this a constitutional assessment. 
Professor Zeisberg’s answer—that the standards that emerge from her 
analysis of the capacities of the various governmental actors “are distinctively 
constitutional to the extent that the capacities themselves are constitutional 
ones” (p. 31)—is a non sequitur. All capacities of the President and Congress 
are “constitutional ones,” in the sense that the President and Congress are 
created by the Constitution and can only act in the ways empowered by it. That 
includes the capacity to engage in pork-barrel politics, to exercise dubious 
discretion in enforcement, and to appoint political hacks to supervise responses 
to medical pandemics. Professor Zeisberg’s criteria strike me as far better 
capacities for judging foreign policy than these others, but that is not because 
 
14 See generally Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Originalism as a Legal Enterprise, 23 
CONST. COMMENT. 47 (2006). 
15 Note that a good constitutional interpretation will not necessarily reflect good foreign 
policy. The criteria for evaluating foreign policy decisions are unlikely to have much to do 
with the sorts of things that make for good interpretations of texts, unless one somehow 
believes that the Constitution uniformly prescribes normatively sound answers to 
contemporary foreign policy issues, which seems more than a bit unlikely. 
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her criteria are somehow “more” constitutional. They are all equally 
constitutional. Constitutionality is not a matter of degree; it either exists or it 
does not.16 Professor Zeisberg’s criteria are surely more appropriate as a 
matter of common-sense normative judgment than are some other 
constitutionally derived criteria that one can imagine, but that does not make 
their application a “constitutional” determination. 
Consider in this regard perhaps the most complete description of Professor 
Zeisberg’s approach: 
What is the methodology of this book? The relational conception starts by 
identifying the relevant substantive terms at stake in the Constitution’s 
allocation of power; then identifies the institutional process(es) harnessed 
to give content to that substantive vocabulary; theorizes the terms on 
which these different processes are related to one another, if there is more 
than one (i.e., the terms of interbranch relationship); develops standards 
related to those institutional processes; and then assesses moments of 
constitutional politics in terms of those relevant substantive and 
processual standards. This method enables a normative analysis of 
constitutional politics in light of constitutional ideals. (p. 223). 
Everything is fine until the last two words. We still lack something that 
translates a metric for evaluating policy into a metric for evaluating 
interpretations of a text. Invoking constitutional ideals rather than 
constitutional texts does not do the trick. The Constitution does not contain 
ideals. It contains provisions. The document’s drafters and ratifiers (real or 
hypothetical) no doubt hoped and/or expected those provisions to promote 
certain ideals, but constitutionality consists of adherence to the provisions of 
the Constitution, not to the hopes or expectations that may have spawned 
them.17 It is of course possible for a provision textually to incorporate a hope 
or ideal or goal; just imagine a provision that reads: “Congress shall have 
power to take whatever action may be necessary to promote national security.” 
It just so happens, contingently but factually, that the provisions of the 
 
16 This is a statement about metaphysics, not epistemology. It does not mean that there is 
a known, determinate answer to every question at each point in time. It simply means that 
constitutionality is a binary quantity, though which of the two quantities is correct may not 
always be known. 
17 For more on this, in the specific context of the Sotirios-Barber-like emphasis on the 
Preamble that Professor Zeisberg seems at times to adopt, see ZEISBERG, supra note 6, at 
241, and Gary Lawson, Understanding State Constitutions: Locke and Key, 93 TEX. L. REV. 
SEE ALSO 203, 207-09 (2015). For now, it is enough to note that the Preamble, while 
expressing certain ideals, is not a grant of power to any governmental actor. The 
mechanisms for achieving—or not achieving—those Preambular ideals are the power-
granting clauses (and the clauses that limit the exercises of those powers). It is quite possible 
that the Constitution is a colossal botch job that will utterly fail to achieve the hoped-for 
ends and ideals. The extent to which the power-granting (and power-limiting) provisions 
actually serve the hoped-for ends, and thus fulfill the expectations of the Preamble, is an 
empirical question. 
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Constitution relevant to the war powers debate do not take this form; there is 
no abstract “power to promote national security” clause,18 but simply a series 
of clauses that the drafters/ratifiers hoped or expected, rightly or wrongly, 
would promote national security if implemented. At the very least, if Professor 
Zeisberg believes that the relevant provisions take such a form, there needs to 
be an argument to that effect. 
Professor Zeisberg, perhaps anticipating this analysis, observes that her 
methodology “varies dramatically from traditional legal modalities of 
constitutional assessment.” (p. 223). There is nothing at all wrong, and in many 
contexts perhaps a great deal right, with varying dramatically from traditional 
legal modalities. But then why call the resulting analysis “constitutional”? 
Does anything at all change if the adjective “constitutional” is expunged from 
the passage? Why not just call it a normative assessment, declare victory, and 
be done with it? 
There is a ubiquitous drive on both sides of all relevant legal spectrums to 
“constitutionalize” almost everything, as though one would not have enough 
traction for an argument without the word “constitutional” somehow being a 
part of it. But not everything has a constitutional answer. How well Congress 
and the President perform their tasks is not necessarily a distinctively 
constitutional question. The Constitution creates certain institutions and gives 
them certain powers, subject to certain constraints. That is all that it does. To 
be sure, that is a great deal, but it is less than everything in the universe. One 
simply does not violate the Constitution by behaving sub-optimally unless 
there is some constitutional provision that dictates that functions be performed 
with a certain degree of optimality. 
As it happens, the Constitution does actually contain some norms of 
competence along the lines proposed by Professor Zeisberg. To the extent that 
the Constitution is a fiduciary instrument, it imposes a duty of care, as well as 
various other fiduciary duties, that can be used to assess the performance of 
governmental actors in a genuinely—meaning textually grounded—
constitutional sense.19 It is quite possible that some, and perhaps even most, of 
Professor Zeisberg’s relational and processual criteria can be derived from 
these fiduciary norms. It is not at all, as Vizzini might say, inconceivable that 
Professor Zeisberg is absolutely right about absolutely everything that she says 
about appropriate constitutional standards for judging the performance of 
executive and legislative actors. But those norms would have to be derived 
 
18 The Taxing Clause contains the words “provide for the common Defence,” U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, but those words merely describe one of the permissible uses of the 
taxing power; they do not independently grant any power to Congress. 
19 For a brief introduction to this concept, see Gary Lawson, Guy Seidman & Robert G. 
Natelson, The Fiduciary Foundations of Federal Equal Protection, 94 B.U. L. REV. 415 
(2014). Guy Seidman and I are currently writing a book that will expand upon and apply the 
concept to a wide range of settings, including the war power. See (even though you can’t 
because it does not yet exist) GARY LAWSON & GUY I. SEIDMAN, “A GREAT POWER OF 
ATTORNEY”: UNDERSTANDING THE FIDUCIARY CONSTITUTION (forthcoming 2017 or so). 
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from a process of interpretation—that is, from the application of a sound 
interpretative theory to the relevant textual provisions. If those norms do not 
emerge from such a process, there is no epistemological warrant for calling 
them constitutional norms—even if they happen, by chance, metaphysically to 
correspond to genuine constitutional norms. 
Similarly, the Constitution contains some actual provisions that specifically 
call for some of the “relational” inter-branch engagement favored by Professor 
Zeisberg (and by Professor Griffin as well). The President must “from time to 
time give to the Congress Information of the State of the Union,”20 and he must 
also “recommend to their Consideration such Measures as he shall judge 
necessary and expedient.”21 The President must get “the Advice and Consent 
of the Senate”22 when making treaties or appointing certain officers. If the 
President chooses to veto a bill, “he shall return it, with his Objections to that 
House in which it shall have originated.”23 These are all provisions that 
demand interdepartmental engagement of some sort. But there is no 
generalized “consult with the other departments” clause beyond these specific 
provisions. Again, it may be good prudence to draw on the expertise of others, 
including other governmental institutions; and if the Constitution is a fiduciary 
instrument, there may even be a constitutional foundation for some version of 
that prudential requirement. But there is nothing constitutionally obligatory 
about interdepartmental consultation unless it derives from such a textually 
grounded fiduciary principle or a particularized provision. 
In sum, I suspect that one could delete the word “constitutional” entirely 
from Professor Zeisberg’s book and not lose much by the excision. Virtually 
all of her insights—and they are many, and go unnoted here only because I am 
focusing on a very narrow point—can be made without invoking the specter of 
the Constitution. 
Four brief thoughts before moving on: First, nothing that I have said here 
endorses settlement as a constitutional imperative, or even as a constitutional 
good. The Constitution does not contain a “settlement” clause. If one chooses 
to endorse settlement as a normative matter—and I am very, very far from a 
fan of settlement as a normative matter24—one must import that normative 
preference from outside the Constitution. 
Second, Professor Zeisberg posits “we should be skeptical of accounts of 
constitutional fidelity that begin with the premise that the ordinary behavior of 
elected officials is constitutionally deficient.”25 At least some, and perhaps 
 
20 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.  
23 Id. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. 
24 See, e.g., Gary Lawson, Interpretative Equality as a Structural Imperative (Or 
“Pucker Up and Settle This!”), 20 CONST. COMMENT. 379 (2003). 
25 ZEISBERG, supra note 6, at 9. I assume that Professor Zeisberg urges skepticism 
towards approaches that yield conclusions that much of historical and contemporary practice 
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many, originalist approaches definitely yield such a conclusion—about war 
powers as well as other matters. But why should one be skeptical in this 
fashion, any more than one should start with the premise that everything is 
unconstitutional? The extent to which the behavior of officials is consistent 
with the Constitution is decidedly an empirical question, and I am at a loss to 
see why one would start with a presumption either way. The facts are what 
they are.26 
Third, and somewhat off point in this essay (and I even mention it only 
because it is a pet peeve), Professor Zeisberg notes that the aim of her 
approach “is to show how the relational conception illuminates common 
intuitions,” (p. 51) and she emphasizes that “the relational conception can 
accommodate common intuitions . . . [and] explain those intuitions . . . .” (p. 
51). “Common” among whom? Among elite academics? Rural church-goers in 
Wyoming? The attendees at a meeting of the Atlas Society (dedicated to the 
study of the thought of Ayn Rand)? I suspect that one will find very different 
intuitions “common” depending upon which social circles one inhabits. But 
more fundamentally, why would anyone care for a moment what anyone, 
including oneself, does or does not intuit? While the idea of rationalizing 
intuitions has acquired an intellectual cachet of sorts ever since John Rawls 
used it to assure left-liberals that their prejudices are the starting point, and 
likely ending point, of moral theory,27 it is a rather peculiar intellectual move 
when examined carefully. If the intuitions that are the data points of analysis 
happen to be false, then a theory that accommodates them, or even gives them 
the time of day, is a giant step backwards. One needs a theory about why 
intuitions are epistemologically reliable forms of cognition in the context under 
discussion, and that is a tall order. 
Fourth, and most importantly, there is something profoundly unfair to 
Professor Zeisberg about my entire discussion thus far. Professor Zeisberg was 
well aware when she wrote her book that people like me would react precisely 
as I am reacting here. One of her main aims is to present an alternative account 
of “constitutionalism” that does not focus on interpretative correctness. Surely 
Professor Zeisberg is entitled to use the term “constitutional” in any way that 
 
is unconstitutional; no one takes that as a premise.  
26 Somewhat relatedly, it is also hard to see why one would worry that traditional 
approaches that judge interpretations by how well they interpret “amplify[] conflict between 
interpretative positions in larger political and academic debate.”  Id. at 247. Does this mean 
that interpretative theories are subject to a heckler’s veto that can take them off the table 
simply by virtue of the fact of disagreement? Conflict is a good thing if there are falsehoods 
to contest, nothing to fear if truth is on one’s side, and potentially a quite useful 
epistemological tool if right answers are difficult to determine. 
27 See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 19-21, 47-50 (1971). Is this an unfair 
characterization of John Rawls and his 500-plus-page model of reflective equilibrium? In a 
word: No. For the academic, citation-filled version of “No,” see Gary Lawson, The Ethics of 
Insider Trading, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 727, 779 n.214 (1988). 
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she pleases, so long as the term is clearly defined. Why should she have to use 
the term in my preferred fashion? 
Put that way, the answer is, of course, that she is under no obligation, moral 
or epistemological, to use words in the fashion that I prescribe. My concern is 
this: the most common, and even standard, account of the word 
“constitutional” is a lot closer to my usage than to Professor Zeisberg’s (even if 
my account of how to fill in the content of that term is better described as 
“wildly idiosyncratic” than “standard”). There is accordingly a very high risk 
of equivocation when a non-standard definition is introduced. The standard 
account, which links constitutionality with the correct application of theories of 
constitutional interpretation, gives the term “constitutional” certain 
connotations and implications that may not be warranted if the term is instead 
used to mean something like “consistency with relational and processual 
forms.” For example, some people (I am not one of them, but I encounter them 
from time to time) think that calling something “constitutional” entails certain 
normative obligations of obedience, or at the very least calls for a certain 
measure of respect and consideration. But that implication ordinarily stems 
from a conception of “constitutional” that involves derivation of propositions 
from textual analysis, not from policy-based applications of institutional 
capacities. An argument that substitutes Professor Zeisberg’s conception of 
constitutionality for the text-based conception cannot continue to employ the 
implications of the text-based conception unless there is an argument, which I 
have not yet seen, that shows how those implications flow naturally when one 
switches from one meaning to the other. 
To be sure, these risks of equivocation can be minimized or avoided through 
careful identification of the term’s usage and frequent reminders in the course 
of arguments that connotations and implications of the standard account do not 
apply to the non-standard usage. I do not see those reminders in Professor 
Zeisberg’s work. Indeed, my reading of the book—and I am quite willing to be 
told that I have misread it—is that Professor Zeisberg affirmatively believes 
that the standard connotations and implications of the term “constitutional” 
fully apply to her usage. In that sense, and with that clarification, instead of 
saying that I do not think that the word “constitutional” means what she thinks 
it means, I should say that I do not think that the word, as she employs it, 
connotes and implies what she thinks it connotes and implies. 
So how, from within a traditional interpretative framework, would one 
assess the constitutional performance of the President or Congress when the 
constitutional text is indeterminate? Quite simply: if there is no constitutionally 
grounded basis for assessment, then one should not make a constitutional 
assessment. If one cannot judge an action by reference to its consistency with 
the properly interpreted Constitution, then why try to say anything about it at 
all in constitutional terms? It does not suffice to point out that “[t]o refrain 
from [constitutionally] evaluating the interpretive politics behind [the 
allocation of war authority] . . . is to remove highly consequential domains of 
governance from constitutional scrutiny.” (p. 9). Perhaps so. What of it? Why 
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does everything consequential have to come within constitutional scrutiny? 
After all, one can make all sorts of judgments about actions—political 
judgments, moral judgments, and even aesthetic judgments—that do not 
involve the rightness or wrongness of their underlying interpretations as a 
matter of constitutional interpretation. But without an interpretative grounding 
in the meaning of the Constitution, nothing but equivocation is gained by 
calling those judgments “constitutional.” 
I am not expressing here any view as to which, if any, of the difficult 
interpretative problems surrounding the war power have definitive solutions. 
The point is only that any “constitutional” assessment of that debate, as with 
any “constitutional” assessment of the interpretations advanced by the 
President, the Congress, the Supreme Court, or Jack Bauer, must be made with 
very careful attention to what it means for something to be “constitutional” and 
the connotations and implications that accompany that meaning. I fear that 
Professor Zeisberg wants to have her processual Constitution and eat the 
interpretative one, too. 
II 
I have far less to say about Professor Griffin’s Long Wars and the 
Constitution, for the simple reason that it is much more about long wars than it 
is about the Constitution. As Professor Griffin puts it, his book “is more of an 
analytical history of presidential decisionmaking than a legal treatise . . . .” 
(Griffin p. 6). It is part history, part political science, part foreign policy, and I 
can plausibly claim competence in none of the above. To the extent that legal 
issues intertwine with these other analyses, however, Inigo Montoya whispers 
in my ear the word “war.” 
War is a critical concept for understanding the United States Constitution. 
While the word “war” specifically appears only four times—Congress is 
granted the power to “declare War,”28 States may not maintain “Ships of War 
in time of Peace” or “engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such 
imminent Danger as will not admit of delay,”29 and treason against the United 
States is defined as “levying War against them”30—the idea of war permeates 
the document.31 Powers that do not make specific reference to war often gain 
shape from wartime. For example, during war, the President acts as a super-
legislator governing occupied territory32 in a fashion that would defy any 
 
28 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. 
29 Id. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. 
30 Id. art. III, § 3, cl. 1. 
31 See Gary Lawson, Ordinary Powers in Extraordinary Times: Common Sense in Times 
of Crisis, 87 B.U. L. REV. 289, 290-91 (2007) (discussing the general provisions in the 
Constitution that deal with crises the nation might face by allocating authority to Congress, 
the states, and the President). 
32 See GARY LAWSON & GUY SEIDMAN, THE CONSTITUTION OF EMPIRE: TERRITORIAL 
EXPANSION AND AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 151-52 (2004) (“[T]he power of the United 
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plausible understanding of “executive Power” during peacetime.33 Searches 
that would be obviously “unreasonable”34 during times of peace may be 
eminently reasonable during times of war. Statutes that are “necessary and 
proper”35 for effectuating federal powers in wartime could fail that test during 
peacetime. It makes a very big constitutional difference, across a large range of 
powers and limitations, whether the country is or is not at war. As Professor 
Griffin puts it in a slightly different context: “War is different.” (p. 3). 
One difference, of course, may concern whether the President’s use of 
military force in a given context is legal. If the President’s power to deploy the 
American military in a certain fashion depends upon the existence of a state of 
war, and if the President does not have the unilateral power to create or 
ascertain that state, then the President is legally constrained in his or her ability 
to use military force, even if the President believes such use of force to be wise 
policy. Much of Professor Griffin’s book traces the history of such 
deployments. He does not purport to resolve the relevant legal issues in any 
definitive fashion—that would require, at a minimum, articulation of an 
interpretative theory within which to resolve them—so it is not my place here 
to critique his brief discussion. My only point here is that Professor Griffin 
does not really define what he means by “war,” and I am not sure that he can 
get away without such a definition. 
The meaning of the “declare War” clause has long been hotly contested, 
both within and without originalist circles. One theory, associated most closely 
with John Yoo, suggests that the power to “declare” war means only a power 
to bring into play certain international and domestic norms of conduct; it does 
not mean the power to control the use of force, which is vested in the President 
by virtue of the “executive Power.”36 Professor Griffin roundly rejects this 
position.37 While I think that Professor Yoo’s (and Professor Delahunty’s) 
 
States to govern occupied territory stems, not from the grants to Congress of power to 
govern territory that belongs to the United States, but from the provision in Article II 
granting the President the “executive Power,” which includes the power to wage war in 
accordance with international norms.”). 
33 That, of course, has not prevented presidents from advancing, and courts from 
endorsing, wildly implausible understandings of “executive Power” in this context when felt 
needs seemed to call for it. See id. at 166-87 (providing a breakdown of the events 
surrounding war tariff collection by the military government in California that led to Cross 
v. Harrison). 
34 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
35 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
36 See Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 10; John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by 
Other Means: The Original Understanding of War Powers, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 167 (1996) 
(examining the historical and legal background of the war powers in the Anglo-American 
world of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries). 
37 See GRIFFIN, supra note 7, at 41-45 (arguing that John Yoo’s position was “created by 
presidentialists after 1950 in order to help justify the change in the constitutional order 
required by the new circumstances of the Cold War” and “had no prior role in the American 
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theory has more to commend it than is often recognized,38 let us go with 
Professor Griffin and say that the power to “declare War” vests in Congress, 
and only in Congress, the power to bring the United States into a state of war. 
What does that mean retrospectively for past presidential actions and 
prospectively for future ones? 
If “war” means every aggressive use of the American military,39 so that the 
exclusive congressional power to “declare War” means the power to determine 
the timing, terms, and conditions of those uses, then virtually every President 
has committed impeachable offenses,40 because virtually every President has 
made some aggressive use of the American military without even an informal 
congressional declaration of war. On the other hand, if the “declare War” 
clause only requires congressional authorization to create a state of war but not 
to respond to a state of war that already exists,41 then the inquiry about 
presidential action shifts to whether a state of war actually existed in any 
particular instance and whether presidential action was an appropriate response 
to that state of war. And of course both inquiries could be pertinent: one could 
believe, in addition to the “response” theory, that some aggressive uses of 
force are not “war” and are therefore committed to the President through the 
“executive Power,” that some aggressive uses of force are neither “war” nor 
committed to the President and are therefore constitutionally forbidden to any 
federal actor, or that all aggressive uses of force are “war” and therefore 
require congressional authorization. 
 
constitutional tradition”). 
38 I am not convinced that anyone has successfully answered the intricate textual and 
intra-textual argument that lies at the heart of the Yoo-Delahunty position. See Delahunty & 
Yoo, supra note 10, at 139-58. Argument has tended to center around history and practice, 
both of which are potentially useful aids to textual interpretation but both of which are 
decidedly the handmaidens of textual analysis rather than vice versa. To be sure, I am not at 
all certain that the “executive Power” vested by Article II includes the power to initiate a 
war of aggression, so I am not at all certain that Professors Yoo and Delahunty are right in 
their ultimate conclusion, but the question is, I think, closer than many are willing to credit. 
39 It seems to be common ground among everyone that the President can authorize purely 
defensive actions without congressional approval. It is not at all clear to me how at least 
some of the various theories of the war powers derive that position, but let us leave that for 
another day. I use the term “aggressive” to describe uses of the military that do not respond 
to immediate attacks. 
40 Professor Griffin appends an exclamation point to the claim “that presidents should be 
impeached (!) when they fail to get congressional authorization for any military 
intervention, regardless of the circumstances.”  GRIFFIN, supra note 7, at 240. But if the 
underlying substantive view is correct, so that “war” means any use of the American 
military, then impeachment seems like an eminently appropriate remedy to rein in a rogue 
President. Impeachment is only an outlandish idea if the underlying substantive view is 
mistaken. 
41 That is essentially the position of Mike Ramsey. See Ramsey, supra note 10. 
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Professor Griffin makes it very clear that his discussion does not encompass 
all possible uses of force,42 which implicitly means that he does not treat all 
uses of force as “war” for constitutional purposes. For instance, he describes as 
“consistent” (p. 201) with his approach the Office of Legal Counsel’s 
determination that American military intervention in Haiti to overthrow a 
military government “was not a ‘war’ within the meaning of the Declaration of 
War Clause.”43 While that intervention was invited by a government that the 
United States recognized as legitimate, the OLC opinion did not rest on that 
fact alone but considered “the nature, scope, and duration of the 
deployment.”44 Specifically, it said, “we believe that ‘war’ does not exist 
where United States troops are deployed at the invitation of a fully legitimate 
government in circumstances in which the nature, scope, and duration of the 
deployment are such that the use of force involved does not rise to the level of 
‘war.’”45 Professor Griffin takes a similar tack, albeit without the lever of an 
invitation from a recognized government, when he says of the 2011 American 
military intervention in Libya that “there was nothing about the Libya 
operation that made it close to a war or even remotely likely that it would 
become one.” (pp. 250-51). 
I am unclear why having lots of bombs dropping on people from American 
military aircraft is not “close to a war.” Maybe it isn’t a war, or even close, but 
one needs a worked-out theory of what constitutes a constitutional “war” in 
order to make that judgment. The OLC Haiti opinion, with its “this is not a war 
because we say that it isn’t a war” flavor, shows the difficulty of that task.46 I 
can well understand why Professor Griffin wants to avoid it, and because his 
focus is on describing events in major conflicts that are wars by any plausible 
understanding, I suppose that he can get away with it. But in a book about war, 
it would be helpful to know how we are supposed to recognize a war when we 
see one. If Professor Griffin means to endorse something like the OLC 
position, then I cannot really say that I do not think that “war” means what he 
thinks it means, because I will be unable to ascertain what he thinks it means. 
To the extent that there are any distinctively constitutional implications to 
Professor Griffin’s study, we need to know what he thinks it means. 
 
 
42 “Many people believe, for example, that important questions are at stake every single 
time the president orders the use of any sort of military force. By contrast, I closely analyze 
presidential decisionmaking concerning major wars . . . .” GRIFFIN, supra note 7, at 6.  See 
also id. at 30 (“[D]ebate should be centrally concerned with the ability of the executive 
branch to initiate war, ‘real’ wars, major wars, rather than under what circumstances it can 
use military force . . . .”); id. at 31 (“[T]he issue at hand is not presidential use of any sort of 
military force. The issue is war.”). 
43 Deployment of United States Armed Forces into Haiti, 18 Op. O.L.C. 173, 177 (1994). 
44 Id. at 178. 
45 Id. at 179. 
46 For a nice summary of some of the many thorny issues surrounding the definition of 
“war,” see ZEISBERG, supra note 6, at 19-20. 
